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RESUMO 
A literatura de Análise de Comportamento descreve dois tipos de controle: aversivo e positivo. Uma revisão 
de publicações especializadas revelou uma definição objetiva de controle por reforço positivo, mas nenhuma 
definição de controle aversivo. Neste artigo, discutimos o significado científico dos termos “controle” e “aversivo” 
do ponto de vista da Análise do Comportamento. Nós nos concentramos nas probabilidades relacionais entre 
respostas e estímulos que ocorrem durante a interação contínua entre organismos e o ambiente. Supõe-se que o termo 
“controle” significa que um evento (o controlado) é alterado pela ocorrência de outro evento (o controlador). A 
aversividade do controle é analisada em função das “operações” (adição e subtração do estímulo), seus “efeitos” 
(aumento ou diminuição da probabilidade de resposta) e “natureza do estímulo” envolvido (aversivo ou apetitivo). 
Concluímos que uma análise de processos, operações e de natureza do estímulo foi incapaz de identificar um fator 
comum a todas as relações comportamentais definidas como aversivas. Consideramos que, sem critérios claros para 
classificar um controle como aversivo, seria mais parcimonioso falar sobre o controle comportamental sem usar a 
dicotomia aversivo/positivo. Entretanto, se esta dicotomia for mantida, o desenvolvimento de uma análise objetiva de 
respostas eliciadas (emocionais) pode ser uma maneira de caracterizar a referida distinção. 
Palavras-chave: controle; controle aversivo; controle positivo; Análise do Comportamento; questões 
conceituais. 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Behavior Analysis literature describes two types of control: aversive and positive. A review of 
specialized publications revealed an objective definition of control through positive reinforcement, but no definition 
of aversive control. In this paper, we discuss the scientific meaning of the terms “control” and “aversive” from the 
viewpoint of behavior analysis. We focus on the relational probabilities between responses and stimuli that occur 
during the continuous interaction between organisms and the environment. The term “control” is assumed to mean 
that one event (the controlled one) is changed by the occurrence of another event (the controller). The aversiveness of 
the control is analyzed as a function of “operations” (addition and subtraction of the stimulus), their “effects” (the 
increase or decrease of the response probability) and the “nature of the stimulus” involved (aversive or appetitive). 
We conclude that an analysis of processes, operations, and the nature of the stimulus was unable to identify a factor 
common to all the behavioral relations defined as aversive. We consider that without clear criteria for classifying a 
control as aversive, it would be more parsimonious to talk about behavioral control without using the 
aversive/positive dichotomy. However, if this dichotomy is maintained, the development of an objective analysis of 
elicited (emotional) responses may offer a way to characterize the aversive/positive distinction. 
Key words: control; aversive control; positive control; behavior analysis; conceptual questions. 
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The behavior analysis literature describes two types 
of control: aversive and positive. Based on Hineline's (1984) 
conclusion that aversive control is not a specific type of 
control, it would be more parsimonious to talk about 
behavioral control without using this dichotomy. However, 
this dichotomy has been present since the earliest 
experiments and remains in use today, although variations in 
the terminology exist (Mayer & Gongora, 2011). This 
persistence of the aversive/positive dichotomy may be an 
indication that it contributes to the understanding of the 
central phenomenon, namely, the behavior. If this is the 
case, clear definitions of the two types of control are 
required. A review of the specialized literature revealed that 
although there is an objective definition of control by 
positive reinforcement, no such definition of aversive 
control exists. Rather, there is only a listing of operant and 
respondent relations that are classified as aversive (see 
Catania, 1998). 
The fact that aversive control has been described by 
listing certain behavioral contingencies, while the rationale 
for such a grouping of these contingencies is that they are 
aversive, indicates a circular analysis. Conceptual 
inaccuracies and circular analysis are not welcome in 
science. Considering that behavioral analysis is a science 
that advocates conceptual precision, the present text aims to 
identify clear criteria for classifying aversive control that 
avoid the circular analysis mentioned above. We will try to 
identify these criteria based on the analysis of two terms: 
“control” and “aversive”. 
 
WHAT IS CONTROL? 
In behavior analysis, the term “control” is common. 
For example, the prediction and control of behavior are 
considered the goals of this science (Skinner, 1953); 
furthermore, one of the foundations of operant analysis is the 
control by consequences (Skinner, 1974), and stimulus 
control and aversive control are systematically investigated 
areas of study (Catania, 1998). 
Although “control” is a technical term in behavior 
analysis, it is also used in the common vernacular to convey 
different meanings. Examples include quality control (the 
inspection of activities or products to ensure that they do not 
deviate from the pre-established norms), sound control (the 
movement of buttons or keys on sound equipment to adjust 
the characteristics of sound), flight control (a technical 
necessity for safe airplane flights), etc.. In terms of social 
interactions, “control” is often synonymous with oppression 
and standardization. Especially in cultures in which people 
have lived (or live) under authoritarian political regimes, the 
term control is synonymous with limiting individual freedom 
or reducing differences of opinions and lifestyles. In other 
words, in nonscientific environments, “control” is often 
associated with the notion of domination and imposition. 
Thus, a negative connotation (tyrannical, arbitrary, 
authoritarian role) is associated with the controlling person. 
Considering that scientists are influenced by their 
culture, it is not surprising that the use of the term control in 
the behavioral sciences foments rejection because of the 
implications from its lay use. In this sense, a replacement for 
the scientific use of this term could avoid interference from 
the lay meaning. However, we know how difficult it is to 
change a long-used technical term: if such an attempt is 
made, the change will not be immediate. Therefore, until 
“control” is replaced (if it is replaced) with another technical 
term, we must distinguish it from its lay meaning and clearly 
establish its technical/scientific significance. 
Even some scientific uses of “control” are of no 
interest to the analysis proposed here. Methodologically, we 
speak of experimental conditions (involving the 
manipulation of an independent variable while the others are 
kept constant/controlled) and control conditions (one in 
which the independent variable under study is not present). 
However, these are not the scientific uses of the term that we 
want to analyze. The meaning that is relevant to the analysis 
proposed here is inherent to the logic of functional relations: 
if B is a function of A, then A controls B. Given that the 
study of functional relations is probabilistic, this control 
relationship between events must be considered in the same 
way. Consequently, in the remainder of this paper, “control” 
will mean nothing more than the fact that one event’s 
probability of occurrence
1
 is altered by another event. 
For control to be established or identified, one must 
consider the difference between two relational probabilities 
involving both the occurrence and the absence of the 
supposedly controlling event (Catania, 1972). For example, 
if the probability of the occurrence of B is always high after 
the occurrence of A (p(B/A) = 1.0) and is null in the absence 
of A (p(B/nA) = 0.0), we can say that this difference 
between the probabilities indicates that A controls B. In the 
behavior analyst’s laboratory, if the probability of a food 
pellet presented in the experimental box is 1.0 after a rat 
presses a bar and is 0.0 in its the absence of this action (i.e., 
a continuous reinforcement program), we can say that, by 
definition, the press response to the bar controls the 
presentation of the food pellet. In daily life, if pressing the 
“t” key on the computer keyboard makes the letter “t” 
appear, we can say that we have control over the appearance 
of this letter on the screen. However, when a virus infects 
our computer and phrases begin to appear on the screen 
independent of our action, we have a typical situation in 
which our control over the writing displayed on the 
computer screen is reduced (or abolished). 
Quantification of the degree of control depends on 
the magnitude of the difference between the two examined 
probabilities, which can vary from 0.0 to 1.0. Thus, the 
degree of control is greater as the difference in probability 
                                                                
1
 The same analysis can be applied to change the probability of other 
dimensions of the response, such as strength, duration, topography, etc. 
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between the two terms of the equation increases. In the 
example of the rat exposed to continuous reinforcement, this 
difference was the maximum possible (1.0), which indicates 
that the press response to the bar has full control over the 
presentation of the food pellet. If reinforcement was 
available at a variable ratio two (VR 2), each press of the bar 
would have an intermediate level of control over food 
presentation (p = 0.5). However, if the probability of the 
food being presented was the same after a bar press or no 
press, then we would have a condition in which the subject’s 
response would have no control over the food presentation, 
i.e., presses to the bar and food presentation would be 
independent events. 
Therefore, following this definition, we must 
consider that operant contingencies necessarily involve 
bidirectional control relations: (a) the control relation 
established by the subject over his environment and (b) the 
control relation established by the environment over the 
organism.
2
 From this perspective, even though a stimulus 
(S), which is not contingent on a response (R), interferes 
with the probability of future responses, conceptually 
speaking, this relation does not characterize control by its 
consequences. In fact, one can only speak about 
consequences in the R-S relation when there is a dependent 
relation between the events, i.e., when the probability of S is 
modified by R. If this relation is only temporal (R does not 
change the probability of S), it does not involve consequence 
but rather contiguity. The analysis of the relevance of 
contingency and/or contiguity in determining behavior, 
though intriguing (Bloomfield, 1972; White, 2009), is not 
the objective of the present text. Therefore, we will focus 
only on R-S relations that involve control the way it has 
been defined here.  
In addition, there are others relations in which 
control is characterized by the fact that S changes the 
probability of the occurrence of R, which follows it (S-R 
relation). In the same manner described above, this relation 
also involves an equation with two relational probabilities 
(p(R/S) and p(R/nS)): when the two probabilities differ, we 
have a relation in which S controls R, and the degree of 
control is directly proportional to the magnitude of this 
difference. Whenever the two probabilities are equal, we 
have a condition in which control is not established at the 
levels analyzed here. When the difference between these 
probabilities is high (1.0 or nearly 1.0), we have a relation 
called elicitation (respondent process). When the difference 
is less than 1.0, the process is called induction (Baum, 
2005); in relations of three or more terms with the structure 
S-R-S and a difference of less than 1.0, this process is called 
stimulus control (Catania, 1972). 
                                                                
2
 By response and stimulus, we mean the response class and stimulus 
class, respectively (Catania, 1998). 
 
In respondent relations, there is still the pairing of 
stimuli (S-S relations) that does not involve control because 
the first stimulus (S1) does not change the probability of the 
second stimulus (S2), even though it precedes it. Between 
these stimuli, there is only temporal contiguity. However, 
the product of this pairing is the establishment of a new 
behavior control relation: if S1 does not initially elicit R 
(which is controlled only by S2), through the pairing S1-S2, 
S1 will begin to elicit R, i.e., it will change the probability 
that R will occur. In other words, S1 will begin to control R 
as a conditioned stimulus (Catania, 1998). 
The bidirectionality inherent in the 
technical/scientific concept of “control” as adopted by 
behavior analysis abolishes, as a matter of principle, the 
authoritarianism suggested by the lay usage of the term. 
Given that control is inherently bidirectional, there is no 
isolated power in any part of the behavioral relation: if the 
organism can change the environment and be modified by it, 
the analysis involves a condition in which the organism and 
environment are mutually changed. Metaphorically, this 
process is analogous to a spiral tracing circles that never 
return to the same point of origin: with each turn completed 
by the spiral, it will pass (but not retrace) the point visited on 
the previous turn because the two parts of the relation were 
modified during that turn. 
In the respondent interactions, the bidirectionality 
of control is not as explicit because the central action is not 
of the organism towards the environment but of the 
environment towards the organism. If operant and 
respondent interactions were independent from each other, 
this would be a problem for the analysis of the 
bidirectionality of control. However, the operant/respondent 
interaction is a constant, and the conventional division 
between operant and respondent is only didactic, to facilitate 
the identification of some of the existing controls in the 
behavior under study (Donahoe & Palmer, 1994). Just as one 
cannot neglect the fact that, in the operant interactions, the 
consequent S must necessarily produce (elicit) some change 
in the organism (otherwise it would not be a stimulus), in the 
respondent interactions, it is expected that the elicited R will 
in some way contribute to the change in the probability of 
the organism’s actions towards the environment, either as 
part of a behavioral chain or by fulfilling the role of 
establishing operation (Michael, 1975). By principle, given 
that behavior is a process of continuous interaction, there is 
no relation that is an end in and of itself. Therefore, the 
bidirectionality of control is assumed to be an inherent part 
of the behavioral process. This concept of control is the 
antithesis of the establishment of behavioral stereotypy; 
control is necessarily dynamic and involves interaction 
between parts, producing constant and cumulative renewal. 
This nature of control establishes the enormous complexity 
of the behavior of organisms and their inevitable 
individuality. 
In summary, in the sense provided here, “control” 
is equally applicable to operant and respondent relations. In 
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nature, these relations are continuous and involve endless 
links. This suggests that in the study of these relations, they 
can be infinitely combined and amplified with regard to their 
components. Consequently, we can identify the changes in 
the functions of the stimulus, i.e., its ability to control the 
occurrence of different responses, either those that follow it 
or those that precede it. In this way, we can investigate how 
seemingly simple operations and processes, because they are 
continuous and cumulative, can compose a complex network 
of behavior control (Donahoe & Palmer, 1994). 
 
WHAT IS AVERSIVE? 
Given the functional definition of “control,” it 
remains to be seen what makes it aversive. The textbooks on 
behavior analysis do not define what aversive control is; 
they only classify the behavior relations that have that 
denomination. Although this classification has historically 
occurred in different ways (see Gongora, Mayer, & Mota, 
2009, on changes in the terminology used in the area), the 
current more significant classification proposes that two 
factors establish the criteria for classifying the four basic 
operant relations (Table 1): the first is the operation, i.e., 
whether the stimulus is added (+) or removed (-) as a 
consequence of the response. The second factor is related to 
the behavioral effect, i.e., whether the response is 
strengthened (i.e., has an increased probability of future 
occurrence) or weakened (i.e., has a decreased probability of 
future occurrence) as a function of the operation. The 
strengthening of the response in terms of its consequences is 
called reinforcement, and its weakening is called 
punishment. The combination of the two factors (operation 
and effect) establishes the four basic operant relations: 
positive reinforcement (+ operation, increasing effect), 
negative reinforcement (- operation, increasing effect), 
positive punishment (+ operation, decreasing effect), and 
negative punishment (- operation, decreasing effect). With 
the exception of positive reinforcement, all other operant 
relations are considered to involve aversive control (Baum, 
2005; Catania, 1998). 
In addition, the dual nature of the stimuli involved 
in these behavioral relations – aversive or appetitive – is 
highlighted in Table 1. This designation of the stimulus is 
essentially functional, i.e., it depends on the effect of the 
stimulus within a relation of which it is part. The stimulus is 
deemed aversive if its contingent removal due to a response 
has the effect of increasing the probability of future 
occurrences of that response or if its presentation contingent 
on a response reduces the future probability of the response 
occurring (inverse relations define the stimulus as 
appetitive). Therefore, stimuli that are part of the behavioral 
relations called positive punishment and negative 
reinforcement are classified as aversive, and stimuli that are 
part of positive reinforcement and negative punishment 
contingencies are classified as appetitive (Baum, 2005; 
Catania, 1998). 
However, the mere designation of these relations as aversive 
does not establish the common factor that causes them to be 
grouped in that way. If we say that a punishment relation 
involves aversive control and that it is aversive control 
because it is a punishment relation, we are engaging in 
undesirable circular reasoning. The joint analysis of 
operation and effect, which has been created to avoid 
this circularity is sufficient to characterize each relationship 
individually but not to justify its grouping. In the case of 
positive reinforcement considered in isolation, there is 
nothing to question. However, when we group three 
different behavioral relations under the common 
denomination of aversive control, we have to identify the 
common factor that justifies this grouping. What common 
element allows us to designate a relation as aversive?  
 
Table 1 
Schematic representation of the four basic operant contingencies. 
The R-S relations that are currently considered to involve aversive 
control are shaded. 
 
Could the behavioral effect be this factor? 
Analyzing Table 1, we must conclude that this is not a 
reliable criterion because it does not cover all relations that 
are considered aversive. For example, if the characteristic 
effect of aversive relations is the weakening of the response, 
only the two types of punishment would be included; this 
would leave out negative reinforcement, which is typically 
considered an aversive relation. If the characteristic effect of 
aversive relations is the strengthening of the response, the 
two punishments would be excluded and the two 
reinforcements would be included; this would result in the 
inclusion of positive reinforcement, which is actually the 
only non-aversive relation in this classification. So, we can 
conclude that the effect of a behavioral interaction 
(weakening or strengthening the response) is not the factor 
that characterizes aversive control. 
If so, can the aversive control be characterized by 
the established operation? The answer is no because none of 
the operations are common to the three aversive operant 
relations: the removal of the stimulus contingent on the 
response occurs in the cases of negative reinforcement and 
punishment, but in positive punishment, the operation is the 
addition of a stimulus. Therefore, the use of the operation as 
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the factor that classifies the behavioral relation as aversive is 
also discarded. Finally, if there is no operation or effect 
common to all aversive operant relations, does this 
classification depend on the “nature of the stimulus” 
(aversive) that is part of it? Again, this is not a satisfactory 
alternative either because it omits negative punishment, 
which involves an appetitive stimulus, leaving this process 
out of the classification as aversive. 
This analysis leads to the conclusion that there is no 
objective criterion for a given operant relation to be 
classified as aversive. The weakening of the response could 
be adopted as a sufficient criterion if the proposal by 
Michael (1975) to abolish the operations of addition and 
removal of the consequent stimulus as part of the 
classification of operants were to be accepted in the 
literature. According to that author, if a consequence relation 
produces an increase in the future probability of the 
response, it characterizes a reinforcement relation; if it 
produces a decrease, it characterizes a punishment. 
According to Michael, defining these relations as positive or 
negative is not necessary for the proper analysis of the 
behavior. 
Despite its apparent theoretical/conceptual logic, 
Michael’s (1975) proposal did not generate changes in the 
way behavior analysts classify operant relations, as Baron 
and Galizio (2005) indicate. This low adherence to 
Michael’s proposal seems to indicate that it did not solve the 
problems associated with conventional classification. A 
thought-provoking debate on this topic has been conducted 
by specialists in a series of articles published in The 
Behavior Analyst journal (Baron & Galizio, 2006a, 2006b; 
Chase, 2006; Iwata, 2006; Lattal & Lattal, 2006; Marr, 2006; 
Michael, 2006; Nakajima, 2006, Sidman, 2006; Staats, 
2006). The result of this large series of papers showed that 
there was no consensus among the authors regarding the 
suitability of Michael’s proposal (1975). Interestingly, even 
many of those who theoretically agreed with him have stated 
that, in practice (in teaching or research), they continue to 
use the conventional quadruple classification that considers 
operation (in addition to effect) a criterion for the 
classification of operant relations. 
The problem of a lack of objective criteria for 
classifying control as aversive is even more pronounced in 
the study of respondent relations. For example, what defines 
the relations that control elicited aggression (Azrin, 
Hutchinson, & Sallery, 1964) or conditional suppression 
(Estes & Skinner, 1941) as aversive? Additionally, given the 
variables that allow such classifications to be specified, are 
there any that are common to both, thus justifying the 
grouping of such distinct relations under the same 
designation? As far as we can see, neither of these questions 
has been answered satisfactorily. The behavioral effect does 
not seem to be the determinant of an aversive 
characterization: in aggression studies, the effect involves an 
increase in a topographically defined response (aggression), 
whereas in conditioned suppression studies, it refers to a 
reduction in the probability of the occurrence of a 
functionally defined response (maintained by positive 
reinforcement). Thus, there is apparently no way to support 
the use of the behavioral effect as a common criterion for 
these respondent relations, which are also called aversive. 
Another alternative would be to consider the nature of the 
elicitor stimulus as a criterion for defining the aversiveness 
of the control. However, in behavior analysis, there is 
usually no direct functional classification of stimulus 
aversiveness in the respondent relations: the aversive nature 
of the stimulus (i.e., stimuli that produce escape/avoidance 
or positive punishment) is usually inferred from operant 
studies.
3
 In this context, electric shock, which is used both in 
elicited aggression and conditioned suppression studies, is 
always considered an aversive stimulus even if escape, 
avoidance, or positive punishment are not directly tested. 
When we consider that aversive functions are not 
directly tested in the respondent studies, we find another 
problem: the attribution of the nature of the stimulus without 
a demonstration of its functionality. The a priori attribution 
of the function of the stimulus damages the conceptual 
accuracy that the field proposes for this classification. 
Finally, physically similar stimuli (i.e., those of the same 
duration, intensity, waveform, etc.) can be functionally 
aversive when they are part of one contingency but not when 
they are part of another. For example, Perone (2003) 
compared studies in which electric shocks with an intensity 
below 1.0 mA functioned as aversive stimuli in a 
punishment contingency but not in an avoidance 
contingency. If such differences exist among operant 
relations, what can be said about the differences between 
operant and respondent relations, which already naturally 
differ in other respects? The desirable thing would be for the 
study of respondent relations to apply the same rigor as 
operant studies, establishing independent criteria that allow 
the objective classification of a stimulus as aversive. This is 
a task that is yet to be pursued in this field. 
In the absence of more general criteria, an 
alternative adopted by some researchers has been to quantify 
some responses that are elicited by certain stimuli to allow 
their classification as aversive elicitors. For example, the 
frequency and intensity of vocalizations and abrupt body 
movements (jumps, races, etc.) are responses often elicited 
by electric shock depending on its intensity. In this sense, 
some authors use these responses to define the minimum 
intensity of shocks that would allow them to be classified as 
aversive (Santos & Hunziker, 2010). Likewise, the paw-
                                                                
3 Other biological sciences use some physiological measurements 
as direct indicators of the aversiveness (or “stressful” nature) of a 
stimulus, such as the release of glucocorticoids as a product of 
activation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis 
(Palermo-Neto, 2006). However, these measurements are not 
generally adopted as aversive criteria in studies related to behavior 
analysis. 
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licking response has been considered to be an indicator of 
aversiveness in studies on pain elicited by applications of 
high temperature to the skin of rats tested on a hot plate 
(Hunziker, 1992). However, although these criteria make the 
classification of the stimulus (electric shock or temperature) 
as aversive more objective, they have the disadvantage of 
being specific to the manipulated stimuli and the species 
subjected to them: rats do not lick their paws when they 
receive shocks through the floor, nor do they vocalize when 
placed on a heated surface at 50ºC. Similarly, the same 
electric shock intensity may be aversive to a rat, but not to a 
dog. Therefore, there is not a general way to objectively 
classify the eliciting stimulus as aversive. 
The previous analysis can be extended to other 
aversive behavioral interactions. For example, experiments 
have demonstrated that operant extinction makes aggressive 
responses more likely to occur (Azrin, Hutchinson, & Hake, 
1966). This means that even if discontinuity of 
reinforcement is not an operation typical of aversive 
relations, it exerts the same function (eliciting aggression) 
that has already been demonstrated by electric shocks, i.e., it 
is also aversive. Similarly, it is not typical of aversive 
control that  a stimulus associated with a lower probability 
of positive reinforcement in multiple schemes can acquire a 
punitive function (Jwaideh & Mulvaney, 1976), or a fixed 
ratio schedule for positive reinforcement can induces 
responses that produces time-out period  (that suppress the 
positive reinforcement), which are interpreted as escape 
(Azrin, 1961). These (and other) experimental data suggest 
that positive reinforcement schemes may also involve 
aversive contingencies (Perone, 2003), which indicates the 
need to review the aversive/positive reinforcement 
dichotomy in light of experimental studies. 
In summary, we can conclude that the analysis of 
the processes, operations and nature of the stimulus was 
unable to identify a factor common to all of the behavioral 
relations designated as aversive. Nonetheless, the distinction 
between aversive control and positive reinforcement has 
been maintained; what other type of variable has sustained 
it? 
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES 
The aversive/non-aversive dichotomy is analogous 
to the common-sense distinctions between good/evil, 
pleasant/unpleasant, and other equivalent antagonistic 
relations. For the layperson, the relations classified as 
aversive have as a common factor their unpleasantness or 
undesirableness. In nontechnical language, it is considered 
pleasant to gain something that one likes, just as it is 
unpleasant to lose something one likes. It is unpleasant if 
something we do causes us suffering or discomfort or if we 
experience situations that bother us to the point of seeking 
ways to abolish or avoid them. Although a reference to 
feelings of discomfort or suffering is not a reliable parameter 
for the scientific analysis of behavior, it points to some 
private events, named through verbal community shaping 
(Skinner, 1957), that are generally (but not always) 
compatible with the scientific classification of behavioral 
relations and stimuli designated as aversive. 
Given the imprecision of subjectivity, the science 
of behavior has proposed to work only with objective 
functional relations to substantiate its concepts and analyses 
(Watson, 1913). Thus, the description of sensations (among 
other private events) has not been considered a reliable 
criterion for designating stimuli or the established functional 
relations as aversive. The lack of an objective criterion that 
justifies the grouping of aversive relations allows us to ask 
whether the scientific behavior of classifying aversive 
relations is informally controlled by the consideration of the 
private responses elicited under certain conditions, although 
such considerations are not formally performed. In other 
words, will behavior analysts use as the ultimate (albeit 
undeclared) criterion that the assumption of unpleasant 
sensations underlies the classification of a relation as 
aversive? As Michael (1975) mentioned, the terminology of 
positive reinforcement versus aversive control could be the 
behavior analysis community’s way of referring to “good 
and bad things”. If the criterion that has been used to justify 
the grouping of different relations under the designation of 
aversive control is the qualitative aspects of the private 
elicited responses (sensations), this criterion is not being 
formally considered in most of the behavior analysis 
literature. However, there are exceptions. For example, 
Staats (2006) highlighted the fact that the emotional 
response elicited by aversive relations is very different from 
that elicited by positive reinforcement. According to Staats, 
the absence of a distinction between such responses ignores 
an important aspect of behavior: given that private responses 
are part of the behavioral flow, they can alter the likelihood 
of other public responses occurring. 
In agreement with Staats (2006), we consider that it 
may be indispensable to find ways to include in our analysis 
the private responses elicited by the stimuli that are 
constituents of the interactions of the organism with the 
environment. If we develop ways to study the world under 
the skin (Skinner, 1974), the analysis of elicited responses 
(referred to as emotional responses) may provide a more 
complete view of our object of study. To reach this goal, it 
will be essential to involve the neurosciences. The  
experimental discoveries of that field may help in this 
endeavor to make the measurement and manipulation of 
emotional responses objective (Donahoe & Palmer, 1994). 
We consider that the vast predominance of the 
study of operant analysis and positively reinforced relations 
is only one step in the construction of the science of 
behavior (Catania, 2008). Currently, respondent relations 
have been left in the background as if they were responsible 
only for “simple” reflexive behaviors. The extension of the 
study of respondent relations may account for some 
problems that seem to have no solution through purely 
operant logic, such as the classification and analysis of 
aversive control discussed here. In this sense, the unified 
(non) definition of aversive control 
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reinforcement process proposed by Donahoe and Palmer 
(1994) seems to be a promising alternative for achieving 
greater operant and respondent integration in the study of 
behavior. 
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